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Weighing the Listener's Interests: Justice
Blackmun's Commercial Speech and
Public Forum Opinions
by WILLIAM S. DODGE*
Introduction
In constitutional law, Justice Blackmun is more frequently associ-
ated with privacy than with free speech. He made important contribu-
tions to the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
however, particularly in the areas of commercial speech and public
forum doctrine. His opinions in Bigelow v. Virginia,' Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 and
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona3 brought commercial speech within the
protection of the First Amendment for the first time, and his criticism
of the Court's recent practice of affording commercial speech only in-
termediate protection4 has proven influential. As the author of Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights,5 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad,6 and Burson v. Freeman,7 Justice Blackmun also helped
shape the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine, while his dissent in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund' to the
Court's categorical turn anticipated much of the current criticism of
that doctrine and offers an appealing alternative.
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
Yale College, 1986; J.D., Yale Law School, 1991. Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun, October
Term, 1992. My thanks to Vik Amar, Ash Bhagwat, David Faigman, and Calvin Massey
for commenting on an earlier draft and to John O'Connor and Joanna Silver for helpful
research assistance.
1. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
2. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,431-38 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
5. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality).
6. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
7. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality).
8. 473 U.S. 788, 813-33 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In both commercial speech and public forum cases, Justice Black-
mun's opinions reflect a distinctive balancing approach that takes seri-
ously the listener's interests in receiving information and, sometimes,
in not receiving information. 9 While the Justice is frequently consid-
ered one whose views changed over the years,10 his approach to free
speech demonstrates a remarkable consistency-not just across differ-
ent areas of First Amendment law, but across time. The seeds of Jus-
tice Blackmun's listener-oriented balancing approach are evident in
two opinions written during his first term on the Court. The commit-
ment to balancing appears in his Pentagon Papers dissent, where he
wrote:
I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the
First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions
[of the Constitution] .... What is needed here is a weighing,
upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the
press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to
prevent.
Justice Blackmun's concern for the listener is revealed in Cohen
v. California2 where he dissented from the Court's decision to over-
turn the conviction for disturbing the peace of a defendant who had
worn a jacket reading "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse. The Justice
characterized Cohen's "absurd and immature antic" as "mainly con-
duct and little speech," and suggested that his slogan might constitute
"fighting words."' 3 It seems likely, though, that Justice Blackmun was
swayed by the argument "that Cohen's distasteful mode of expression
was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers. 14
Cohen and the Pentagon Papers case are First Amendment clas-
sics, and one might have viewed Justice Blackmun's dissents in those
cases as indications that he would be sympathetic to government ef-
forts to suppress speech. Indeed, the conventional wisdom has viewed
both balancing and a concern for the listener's interests as antithetical
to strong protection for speech. Ironically, the balancing approach
that Justice Blackmun championed in his commercial speech and pub-
lic forum opinions proved to be substantially more protective of free
speech than the more categorical approaches that the Court adopted
9. See infra notes 57-119, 218-79 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HAv. L. REv.
717 (1983).
11. New York Tmes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 761 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
12. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
13. Id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 21.
in the 1980s. 15 Indeed, one of the lessons that emerges from studying
Justice Blackmun's commercial speech and public forum opinions is
that a balancing approach to the First Amendment-even one that
weighs the listener's interests-may provide greater protection for
speech than categorical approaches.
Balancing's association with less protection of speech is a legacy
of the McCarthy era, when the Supreme Court used balancing to up-
hold government efforts to investigate and punish subversive activi-
ties.' 6 In dissent, Justice Black, criticized balancing as an abdication
of the judicial role. According to Justice Black, balancing permitted
the Court "to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on
the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness.'
Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts
to little more than an admonition to Congress."' 7 Justice Black was
not overly dramatic in equating the Court's First Amendment balanc-
ing with reasonableness review. In fact, Justice Frankfurter-the
Court's leading advocate of balancing-had equated the two himself.
"Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are
not legislators,"' 8 Frankfurter wrote. "How best to reconcile compet-
ing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike
15. The Court adopted a categorical approach to commercial speech in Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980),
by placing commercial speech in a separate category that is entitled to only an intermediate
level of protection. The intermediate-scrutiny test that Central Hudson applies is a balanc-
ing test, see id. at 566, but so (in theory) are strict-scrutiny and rational-basis review. What
makes Central Hudson's approach categorical and distinguishes it from Justice Blackmun's
is Central Hudson's decision to treat all commercial speech differently from all non-com-
mercial speech. See infra notes 130-65 and accompanying text.
The Court adopted a categorical public-forum analysis in Perry Education Association
v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), which divided government prop-
erty into three categories with different rules applicable to each. Even if the property falls
into the most protected, "public forum" category, the Court applies a balancing test to
determine the permissibility of time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). As with Central Hudson's approach to
commercial speech, however, what makes the Court's public forum doctrine categorical
and distinguishes it from Justice Blackmun's approach is that an initial categorization de-
termines the test to be applied. See infra notes 241-70 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
17. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 539 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless
outside the pale of fair judgment."19
Justice Black's alternative was "absolutism," an approach best de-
fined by its opposition to balancing.2" Categorical First Amendment
analysis, such as that advocated by John Hart Ely and Lawrence
Tribe,2 is a direct descendant of Justice Black's absolutism.' It "im-
munizes all expression save that which falls within a few clearly and
narrowly defined categories,"' and, like absolutism, it opposes balanc-
ing.24 Categorical analysis rejects the notion "that free speech values
and the government's competing justifications must be isolated and
weighed in each case."'  Under a categorical approach, "the consider-
ation of likely harm takes place at wholesale, in advance, outside the
context of specific cases."26 The point is to remove discretion from
judges,27 thereby preventing them from being swept up in the "para-
noia of the age. '
19. Id at 540 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The debate over balancing was also played
out in the law reviews, most famously in an exchange between Laurent Frantz and Wallace
Mendelson. See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J.
1424 (1962); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A
Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. Rnv. 729 (1963); Wallace Mendelson, The First
Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAM. L. REv. 479 (1964).
20. See Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L.
Rnv. 673, 737 (1963) ("'Absolutes' is the way Black refers to that part of his philosophy
which denies to judges the power to weigh competing values.").
21. See JoI- HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-16 (1980); LAWRENCE H.
TRBE, AMEiCAN CONSTrrruIONAL LAW 792-94 (2d ed. 1988).
22. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1500 n.74 (1975)
("Any categorization approach.., can quite properly be labeled absolutist.").
23. ELY, supra note 21, at 110 (emphasis in original).
24. Tribe and Ely have made a few pragmatic concessions to balancing. Both admit
that judges necessarily weigh competing considerations in order to define which categories
of speech are unprotected. See TRBE, supra note 21, at 792-93; ELY, supra note 21, at 110.
Both also allow that balancing is unavoidable when the government regulation is aimed at
the noncommunicative aspect of expression-e.g., regulations limiting the volume of loud-
speakers. See TRIE, supra note 21, at 791, 792; ELY, supra note 21, at 111. Tribe also
seems prepared to recognize, albeit with "discomfort," that some categories like commer-
cial speech should receive a lesser degree of First Amendment protection. See TRIBE,
supra note 21, at 896.
25. Id. at 792.
26. ELY, supra note 21, at 110.
27. See id. at 112.
28. Ely, supra note 22, at 1501; see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and
the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985). For an interesting theory on how
balancing can be structured to avoid too much deference to the legislature, see David L.
Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 641 (1994).
Categorical analysis has inherited absolutism's reputation for pro-
tecting speech. However, the inflexibility of a categorical approach
creates two related dynamics that tend to weaken First Amendment
protection: narrowing and dilution. Because the Court is required to
treat all cases in the same category the same way, it tends to define
these categories narrowly and to dilute the level of protection af-
forded to each. As Martin Redish has noted, a categorical approach
"will often prove to be either overprotective or underprotective in in-
dividual instances. Given such a choice, as a practical matter a court is
considerably more likely to choose a rule that will be underprotective
than one that will be overprotective. '29 The Supreme Court's experi-
ence with commercial speech and public forums illustrates these dan-
gers. The Court's relegation of commercial speech to an intermediate
category of protection"° is a perfect example of dilution, while its limi-
tation of public forums to places like streets and parks that have tradi-
tionally been used for expressive activities3' reflects the dynamic of
narrowing. Justice Blackmun's balancing approach has proven more
protective of speech in each area because it allows the flexibility to
accommodate the legitimate interests at stake (particularly those of
the listener), while still permitting broad access to government prop-
erty for expressive activities3 2 and full First Amendment protection
for commercial speech.33
Part I of this Article examines Justice Blackmun's listener-ori-
ented balancing approach for commercial speech and how it came to
29. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1186-87 (1982); see also Fred-
erick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265, 276 (1981) ("One danger of definitional-absolutist theories ... is that the criteria
of absolutism exerts an inward pull on the boundaries of coverage.").
Justice Frankfurter made essentially the same point in criticizing Justice Black's
approach:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions
would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic
society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian
problems to be solved.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
30. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
31. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992).
32. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
813-33 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,431-38 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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be supplanted by a more categorical approach. Part II demonstrates
how Justice Blackmun used the same listener-oriented balancing ap-
proach in the public forum area, while the Court again moved to a
more categorical analysis. Part III looks at recent developments in
both areas. Within the last few years, several members of the
Supreme Court have criticized its current public forum doctrine, and
five members of the current Court appear ready to reconsider its cate-
gorical approach to commercial speech. By examining two types of
cases that categorical approaches find hard to handle-restrictions on
protesters in public forums around abortion clinics and mandatory dis-
closure requirements for commercial speakers like cigarette warning
labels and registration requirements for securities-I argue that the
Court should abandon its categorical approaches in both areas in
favor of a listener-oriented balancing approach.
I. Commercial Speech
Justice Blackmun's First Amendment jurisprudence is most
strongly identified with the protection of commercial speech.34 Justice
Blackmun launched the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence in
three majority opinions and remained, until his retirement, the
Court's most vigorous protector of commercial speech."
When Justice Blackmun joined the Court in 1970, the last word
on commercial speech was Valentine v. Chrestensen,36 a brief unani-
mous opinion in which the Court stated that "the Constitution im-
poses no... restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising. '37 Justice Blackmun's opinions would soon change that.
34. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication,
71 TEx. L. Rav. 697, 727-31 (1993) (referring to the protection of commercial speech as
"Justice Blackmun's First Amendment"); Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contri-
butions on the Court: The Commercial Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 Hmn.m L.
REv. 29, 31-43 (1985) (discussing Justice Blackmun's contributions in the area of commer-
cial speech). The Justice also singled out his commercial speech opinions as demonstrating
his concern for First Amendment rights. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 549 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 431-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
36. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
37. Id. at 54. Chrestensen upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance banning adver-
tising handbills. Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner have argued convincingly that the Jus-
tices rejected Chrestensen's suit because they saw it (1) as an attempt to revive substantive
due process review of economic legislation and (2) as an opportunity to limit the poten-
tially expansive right to distribute handbills (in a public forum), which they had recently
recognized in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. RFv. 747, 756-74
(1993).
In Bigelow v. Virginia,3" he held that an advertisement for abortion
services was protected by the First Amendment. One year later, he
extended that protection to purely commercial advertising in Virginia
Pharmacy.3 9 And the following year, in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona,40 he struck down limitations on advertising by attorneys.
Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates articulated a distinctive
approach to commercial speech issues: a balancing approach that em-
phasized the listener's interests. Although this approach initially en-
joyed the support of every member of the Court but Justice
Rehnquist, it was soon supplanted by a more categorical approach
championed by Justice Powell. Central Hudson41 codified Powell's ap-
proach in an intermediate scrutiny test which has remained the
Court's test for restrictions on commercial speech to this day.42 De-
spite the theoretical advantages of a categorical approach in limiting a
judge's discretion, Central Hudson's test proved highly manipulable.
It was watered down over the next decade until it was hardly more
stringent than the rationality review Justice Rehnquist had favored in
Virginia Pharmacy.
Since 1993, however, the Court's protection of commercial
speech has strengthened, and there are indications that the Court may
wish to abandon Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny test entirely.
The turning point was Discovery Network,4 3 in which the Court re-
jected the notion that commercial speech is inherently less valuable
than noncommercial speech and applied an approach that was strik-
ingly similar to Justice Blackmun's. Subsequently, in 44 Liquormart,4
five of the current Justices expressed their dissatisfaction with Central
Hudson in the course of striking down restrictions on advertising the
price of alcohol.45 In Part III, I will argue that the Court should aban-
38. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
39. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
40. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
41. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
42. For explanation of the categorical nature of Powell's approach, see supra note 15,
infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text.
43. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
44. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
45. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, proposed that truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech receive full First-Amendment protection. Id. at 501-04.
Justice Thomas refused to apply Central Hudson and urged a return to Virginia Pharmacy.
Id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also expressed "discomfort" with Cen-
tral Hudson but was uncertain about what should replace it. Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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don Central Hudson and return to the listener-oriented balancing ap-
proach that Justice Blackmun articulated in Bigelow, Virginia
Pharmacy, and Bates, but first it is necessary to recount the story of
commercial speech during Justice Blackmun's time on the Court.
A. Justice Blackmun's Balancing Approach: Bigelow, Virginia
Pharmacy, and Bates
Not only had the Court stated in Chrestensen that commercial
advertising was outside the scope of the First Amendment,4 6 it had
repeatedly relied on the distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech over the following three decades.47 However, individ-
ual Justices began to question whether commercial speech should be
entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment. In 1959, Justice
Douglas, who had joined the Chrestensen opinion, described that rul-
ing as "casual, almost offhand" and stated that "it has not survived
reflection."'48
In 1973, the issue of commercial speech was raised again in Pitts-
burgh Press, a case challenging a restriction on printing help-wanted
ads in sex-designated columns.49 The Court avoided reconsidering
Chrestensen on the ground that, because employment discrimination
was illegal, "[a]ny First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal" was "absent."5 Never-
theless, between the dissenters in Pittsburgh Press and those in Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights5 the following Term, the number of
Justices expressing doubts about Chrestensen's continuing validity
swelled to seven.52 Justice Blackmun was among the Pittsburgh Press
dissenters, agreeing with Justice Stewart that Chrestensen should be
46. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
47. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
384-88 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,266 (1964); Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533 (1945); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
48. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
50. Id. at 389.
51. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). For further discussion of Lehman, see infra notes 218-28 and
accompanying text.
52. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 393 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); i. at 398 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Leh-
man, 418 U.S. at 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.,
dissenting).
read narrowly" but, significantly, disassociating himself from Justice
Stewart's attack on balancing.54
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Bigelow severely nar-
rowed Chrestensen55 and his opinion in Virginia Pharmacy overruled
it.56 Rather than proceed in strict chronological order through Bige-
low, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates, I treat them together because they
adopt a consistent approach that is better illustrated by drawing on all
three cases.
1. Why Protect Commercial Speech?
In Justice Blackmun's view, commercial speech deserved First
Amendment protection for two reasons-one general and one spe-
cific. The first and more general reason was simply the absence of any
good reason to exclude it from First Amendment protection. Freder-
ick Schauer has observed that in defining the coverage of the First
Amendment, one has a choice between "defining in" and "defining
out."57 Under a "defining in" approach, one starts with a theory of
the First Amendment's purpose and protects only speech which serves
that purpose.5 Under a "defining out" approach, one starts with the
premise that all speech is protected and creates categories of unpro-
tected speech only when there is a good reason to do so. 9 As Schauer
observes, Virginia Pharmacy is a "defining out" opinion: "the primary
question there was not, 'Should commercial speech be covered?', but
in effect rather, 'Why shouldn't commercial speech be covered?" 6
Justice Blackmun's second and more specific reason for protect-
ing commercial speech was that it served the listener's interest in mak-
53. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Whatever validity
the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own facts, it certainly does not
stand for the proposition that the advertising pages of a newspaper are outside the protec-
tion given the newspaper by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
54. See iL at 402 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("So long as Members of this Court view the
First Amendment as no more than a set of 'values' to be balanced against other 'values,'
that Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy."); id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975).
56. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 760 (1976).
57. See Schauer, supra note 29, at 279-80.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See iL at 281; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted) ("Our ques-
tion is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' is so
removed from any 'exposition of ideas,' and from "'truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,"' that it
lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.").
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ing informed decisions.61 As Justice Blackmun put it most famously in
Virginia Pharmacy, "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information... may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. '62  He
pointed out in that case that "[t]hose whom the suppression of pre-
scription drug price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick,
and particularly the aged."' 63 Bigelow had also emphasized the lis-
tener's interests, and so would Bates.64 The speaker's interest, by con-
trast, was downplayed in each of these opinions and was typically cast
in negative terms. In Virginia Pharmacy, for example, Justice Black-
mun wrote: "[W]e may assume that the advertiser's interest is a purely
economic one. That hardly disqualifies him from protection under the
First Amendment. '65 In Justice Blackmun's view, the primary First
Amendment interest served by commercial speech was that of the
listener.66
61. Martin Redish anticipated this point. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment
in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 429,472 (1971) ("By providing the consuming public with information, commercial
speech aids in the attainment of society's goal of intellectual self-fulfillment and, more
importantly, helps the individual to rationally plan his life to achieve the maximum satis-
faction possible within the reach of his resources."). For a fascinating attempt to sketch the
contours of a listener-oriented First Amendment doctrine more generally, see Burt
Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55
BRooKLYN L. REv. 5, 9-40 (1989).
62. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
63. Id.
64. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) ("Viewed in its entirety, the ad-
vertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience");
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,364 (1977) (noting that the listener's interest in
commercial speech is "substantial").
65. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (emphasis added). See also Bigelow, 421 U.S.
at 818 (emphasis added) ("The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's news-
paper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did not
negate all First Amendment guarantees."); Bates, 433 U.S. at 364 ("Even though the
speaker's interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such speech in certain con-
texts."). For further discussion of the speaker's interest, see infra notes 114-17 and accom-
panying text.
66. Those who have argued against protecting commercial speech have had to argue
that the listener's interest is not served by commercial speech or is not cognizable under
the First Amendment. Edwin Baker, for example, has argued that profit-motivated com-
mercial speech distorts rather than enhances the listener's decisions. See C. Edwin Baker,
Commercial Speec: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 15 (1976);
see also Collins & Skover, supra note 34, at 710-27 (cataloguing the ills caused by commer-
cial speech). Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries, on the other hand, have denied that there
is a meaningful difference between one's interest in receiving commercial information and
one's more general interest in economic liberty. See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA.
L. RFv. 1, 33 (1979) ("Exactly the same values that are impaired by Virginia's ban against
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2. The Balancing Approach
Justice Blackmun made his analytic approach plain in Bigelow.
First, commercial speech was not to be treated differently from other
speech. "Advertising, like allpublic expression, may be subject to rea-
sonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest."'67 The re-
lationship of speech to a commercial activity that the State might
legitimately regulate was one factor that the court could balance, but
it did not make commercial speech categorically different from non-
commercial speech.6" Second, treating commercial speech like other
speech meant foreswearing labels and balancing the interests in each
case. Again in Bigelow, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[A] State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights
by mere labels." Regardless of the particular label asserted by
the State-whether it calls speech "commercial" or "commercial
advertising" or "solicitation"-a court may not escape the task
of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing
it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. "
Justice Blackmun's analytic approach is related to his reasons for
protecting commercial speech. His "defining out" methodology and
his recognition of the listener's interests on the one hand and his pref-
erence for balancing over categories on the other are two manifesta-
tions of a skepticism toward overarching First Amendment theories.
To apply a "defining in" approach one needs a First Amendment the-
ory,70 but Justice Blackmun was unwilling to settle on a single theory
of the First Amendment's purpose. In this respect, it is interesting to
note his treatment in Virginia Pharmacy of Alexander Meiklejotn's
theory that the First Amendment is primarily designed to facilitate
democratic decisionmaking. 71 Justice Blackmun took note of the the-
ory and argued that even under this theory commercial speech might
be entitled to First Amendment protection,72 but ultimately he kept
drug price advertising are also invaded by ... most other instances of governmental regula-
tion of the economy.").
67. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826 (emphasis added).
68. See id ("To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the rela-
tionship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in
weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged.").
69. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).
70. See Schauer, supra note 29, at 279-80.
71. ALExANDER MEIKLEOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELAT[ON TO SELF-GovERN-
mmNT (1948).
72. Justice Blackmun's argument was that the free availability of commercial informa-
tion helped the public make decisions about how the free enterprise system should be
regulated. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). Some commentators have argued more generally that commer-
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Meiklejohn at arms length.7' Justice Blackmun's skepticism of the po-
sition that the First Amendment was designed for a single purpose in
turn made him receptive to the argument that the First Amendment
interests of the listener required the protection of commercial
speech.7 4 Balancing also manifests a skepticism towards overarching
theories of the First Amendment. Steven Shiffrin has observed that
balancing rests on the proposition "that there are limits to the level of
generality we can achieve in free speech theory without falling into
triviality or falsehood."'75 Any categorical approach requires rules to
be formulated at a greater level of generality than balancing. Justice
Blackmun not only doubted that such rules could be formulated to
produce correct results in concrete cases, he also feared that categori-
cal labels might be used to ignore the real interests at stake and ulti-
mately to "foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights."76
3. Scrutinizing Government Interests
As discussed earlier, Justice Blackmun viewed the First Amend-
ment interests at stake in the commercial speech context as largely
those of the listener.77 Against those interests, it was necessary to
weigh the government interests allegedly served by the regulation. As
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona78 illustrates, however, Justice Black-
mun's review of government interests was not at all deferential.7 9 Ari-
zona advanced six specific justifications for its restrictions on
cial speech helps develop a faculty for rational decisionmaking. See David F. McGowan,
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. RFv. 359, 412-16 (1990);
Redish, supra note 61, at 443-44.
73. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 & n.19.
74. Compare Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 66, at 5-6 (positing that the First Amend-
ment "protects only certain identifiable values" such as self-government and self-fulfill-
ment through free expression and arguing that commercial speech should not be protected
because it does not serve these values); Baker, supra note 66, at 9-25 (positing that the First
Amendment protects freely chosen self-expression and arguing that commercial speech
should not be protected because it is dictated by profit).
75. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1254 (1983). Shiffrin also
observes that acceptance of balancing requires rejection of any theory that would exclude
one or more of the values of speech. See id.
76. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 429 (1963)).
77. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
78. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
79. For a good discussion of purpose scrutiny in constitutional law, see Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. Rnv. 297 (1997).
advertising by lawyers. Justice Blackmun spent twelve pages examin-
ing and rejecting them. 0
First, the State argued that advertising would undermine the pro-
fessionalism of lawyers. Justice Blackmun found this connection "se-
verely strained" because it "presume[d] that attorneys must conceal
from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers
earn their livelihood at the bar."'" Second, the State argued that at-
torney advertising was inherently misleading, but Justice Blackmun
was not persuaded. Even if advertisements were an incomplete basis
upon which to choose an attorney, some information was better than
none. 2 Third, although advertising might "stir[ ] up litigation," Jus-
tice Blackmun would not "accept the notion that it is always better for
a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action."' 3
Fourth, the State claimed that advertising would raise attorneys' costs
and therefore the prices of their services, but Justice Blackmun
thought it as likely that competition from advertising would drive
prices down. 4 Fifth, Justice Blackmun could not see how advertising
itself would lower the quality of lawyers services because "[a]n attor-
ney who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on
advertising."8 5 Finally, he rejected the argument that banning all ad-
vertising was the only way to prevent deceptive advertising. 6
This was not the balancing approach of Justice Frankfurter. 7 No-
where in this discussion-not even in the consideration of the eco-
nomic effects of advertising-is there a hint of deference to the State's
judgments. Indeed, Justice Blackmun candidly acknowledged in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy that justifications that had been sufficient to sustain
advertising bans challenged on due process and equal protection
grounds would be inadequate to survive the "close inspection" re-
quired by the First Amendment. 8 Unlike Justice Frankfurter,8 9 Jus-
tice Blackmun thought that the balancing required by the First
80. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977).
81. Id. at 368.
82. See idL at 372-75.
83. Id. at 375-76.
84. See id. at 377-78.
85. Id. at 378.
86. See id. at 379.
87. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
88. Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
89. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not
legislators.").
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Amendment was quite different from that required by the due process
and equal protection clauses.90 Moreover, Justice Blackmun found re-
peatedly that:
on close inspection it is seen that the State's protectiveness of its
citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being
kept in ignorance .... It appears to be feared that if the phar-
macist who wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low qual-
ity, services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on his
offer by too many unwitting customers. 91
Justice Blackmun rejected such justifications as "highly paternalis-
tic,"92 grounding this rejection in the First Amendment itself: "It is
precisely [the] choice, between the dangers of suppressing informa-
tion, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us."'93
4. The Listener's Interest and "Commonsense Differences"
Justice Blackmun was willing to permit greater regulation of com-
mercial speech, however, when it was necessary to protect the lis-
tener's autonomy. In Bigelow, he suggested that the State's interest in
shielding its citizens from information might be entitled to more
weight if the advertisement were "deceptive or fraudulent," if "it re-
lated to a commodity or service that was ... illegal," or if it "would
invade the privacy" of a State's citizens or thrust its message upon
them as a "captive audience." 94 In each of these examples, the lis-
tener's autonomy would be enhanced, or at least would not be
harmed, by restrictions on commercial speech. Though the "captive
audience" problem is the clearest example of state action to protect
the listener, 95 restrictions on deceptive advertising or ads that propose
illegal transactions fall under this heading as well. As Justice Black-
mun later explained, "[a] listener has little interest in receiving false,
misleading, or deceptive commercial information .... Furthermore,
90. See also Bhagwat, supra note 79, at 331-34 (arguing that the legitimacy of govern-
mental purposes varies with the right at issue).
91. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-
28 (1975) ("Virginia is really asserting... an interest in shielding its citizens from informa-
tion about activities outside Virginia's borders .... This asserted interest, even if under-
standable, was entitled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances."); Bates, 433 U.S. at
375 ("we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public
ignorance").
92. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
93. Id.
94. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 828.
95. For further discussion of the "captive audience," see infra notes 220-22, 271-79 and
accompanying text.
to the extent it exists at all, a listener has only a weak interest in learn-
ing about commercial opportunities that the criminal law forbids."9 6
In the last section of Virginia Pharmacy and in its famous foot-
note 24, Justice Blackmun elaborated on the ways in which commer-
cial speech might be regulated, suggesting that certain restrictions on
commercial speech might be permissible even though the same restric-
tions on noncommercial speech would be forbidden. In particular, he
suggested that the government could prohibit deceptive or misleading
advertising.97 To prevent deceptive advertising, it might be permissi-
ble to require additional information and disclaimers98 or even to im-
pose prior restraints.99
Justice Blackmun's explanation for this different treatment of
commercial speech was that there were "commonsense differences"
between commercial and noncommercial speech.' Commercial
speech was "more easily verifiable by its disseminator" and was "more
durable" because of the profit motive.' 0 ' Commentators have ques-
tioned both the comparative verifiability and durability of commercial
speech. They have argued that commercial ads stating that eggs are
good for you'02 or that "America is turning 7-Up,"'0 3 may in fact be
more difficult for the speaker to verify than much political speech.'04
It is also questionable, they have suggested, whether a profit motive
96. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 432-33 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
97. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24. Compare New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring "actual malice" for false statements about
public officials).
98. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (holding right-of-reply statute unconstitutional);
Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all"); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
348 (1995) ("The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information
does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would
otherwise omit.").
99. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Compare New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (per curiam) (heavy presumption against the constitutional valid-
ity of prior restraints).
100. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
101. Id.
102. See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.
L. Rnv. 372, 385 & n.64. (1979).
103. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 627, 635 (1990).
104. See Farber, supra note 102, at 386 ("A political candidate knows the truth about
his own past and his present intentions, yet misrepresentations on these subjects are im-
mune from state regulation.").
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makes speech more durable than a religious or artistic motive. 05
And, even if businesses will inevitably continue to advertise, shouldn't
we be concerned that businesses will change the content of their ads
because of government regulation?10 6
Each of these criticisms is valid in a narrow sense, but each also
misses the central theme of Virginia Pharmacy's footnote 24-that be-
cause businesses can verify some information about their products and
have an economic incentive to convey some information about their
products, "truthful and legitimate commercial information" will con-
tinue to reach the consumer. 0 7 Thus, even though the "commonsense
differences" identified in footnote 24 appear to focus on the speaker,
Justice Blackmun's main concern here, as in the rest of Virginia Phar-
macy, is the interest of the listener. If a statement touting the health
benefits of eggs cannot be verified by the advertiser, then it is not
much use to the consumer. And if it is in fact misleading, then it may
harm the consumer. 0 8 But there are presumably things that any egg
seller knows about her eggs (starting with their price) that would be
useful to a consumer and would induce him to buy eggs. Thus, if asked
whether we should be concerned that regulation will cause businesses
to change the content of their ads, Justice Blackmun would answer
"no"-not if it causes them to make the ads more accurate and there-
fore more useful to the listener.
Moreover, only when one reads footnote 24 as primarily con-
cerned with the interests of the listener can one can make sense of
Justice Blackmun's suggestions that the government might require
commercial ads to carry disclaimers or information to prevent decep-
tion and that the prohibition against prior restraints might not ap-
ply.10 9 The speaker presumably has the same interest in controlling
the content of her speech and in its immediacy whether that speech is
commercial or noncommercial. But because the listener has no inter-
est in receiving deceptive commercial speech, his interest may be
105. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 103, at 637.
106. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. RBv. 591, 633
(1982) ("The possibility of regulation would not deter him entirely from advertising, but it
might deter him from making certain controversial claims for his product.").
107. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added).
108. Martin Redish also asks: "If a consumer organization is constitutionally protected
in asserting that a certain product does not do what is claimed, why should the product's
manufacturer not be similarly protected in contending that it does?" See Redish, supra
note 106, at 633. One answer, is that the manufacturer has a greater incentive than a
consumer organization to bend the truth, which may mean that tighter restrictions are
necessary to protect the listener.
109. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
served by disclaimers and even by the prior restraint of misleading
ads.
The same point explains Bates's holding that the doctrine of over-
breadth is not applicable to commercial speech. 110 Justice Blackmun
explained the holding in terms of Virginia Pharmacy's "commonsense
differences"-if commercial speech was more durable and more easily
verified, it was less "susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regula-
tion""'1-but the analysis is easily recast in terms of the listener's in-
terest. Indeed, Bates observed that "use of overbreadth analysis
reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that protected speech will be muted.""' 2 From the listener's view-
point, the question is whether it is worth protecting false and mislead-
ing commercial speech (which would harm consumers) in order to
foster truthful commercial speech (which would benefit them). Be-
cause, in Justice Blackmun's view, an advertiser would always have
the ability and the incentive to convey truthful information to con-
sumers," 3 there was simply no need to tolerate misleading commer-
cial speech. Indeed, since an advertiser might think that misleading
ads would be more effective in selling her products, providing the ad-
ditional protection of overbreadth might discourage truthful commer-
cial speech.
But what about the speaker's interests? Should they matter at all
in the analysis of commercial speech issues? Under Justice Black-
mun's framework, the interest of the speaker in conveying truthful
information about her product coincides with the listener's interest in
receiving that interest and is therefore protected. But there are at
least two interests of the speaker that Justice Blackmun does not seem
to recognize. First, the speaker may have an interest in conveying
false or misleading information in order to sell her product. This in-
terest, Justice Blackmun suggests, is either illegitimate or is out-
weighed by the listener's interest in not being deceived." 4 Second,
110. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
111. Id. at 381.
112. Id. at 380 (emphasis added); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Over-
breadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 890 (1991) (overbreadth forces the state to forego "opportuni-
ties to impose sanctions for conduct that the state legislature wanted to prohibit and that is
not itself constitutionally protected.").
113. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
114. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 ("Untruthful speech, commercial or other-
wise, has never been protected for its own sake.").
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the speaker may have an interest in free expression.115 Alex Kozinski
and Stuart Banner point out that many television ads resemble short
films. 1 16 Still, one may doubt the strength of an advertiser's interest in
self-expression as compared with her interest in selling a product. 1
7
Furthermore, conceding that an advertiser has some interest in self-
expression, one must recall that the only expressive freedom Virginia
Pharmacy suggests may be denied the advertiser is the freedom to be
deceptive or misleading. It is at this point, presumably, that the lis-
tener's interest in not being misled outweighs whatever interest in
free-expression the speaker may have.
In sum, Justice Blackmun's observations about the "common-
sense differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech
are best understood as general observations about how the listener's
interest varies in the two contexts. In a commercial context, the lis-
tener has an interest in receiving truthful information and an interest
in being protected from false and misleading information. Moreover,
unlike the noncommercial context, it is not necessary to protect false
and misleading communications in order to ensure the flow of truthful
ones. However, to say that the listener's interests vary between the
two contexts is not to say that commercial speech as a category is less
valuable than political speech."' Neither is it to say that commercial
speech should be treated in a categorically different manner from non-
commercial speech.119
115. Some have argued that commercial advertisers have no interest in free expression.
See Baker, supra note 66, at 17-18 (profit motive breaks the connection between speech
and personal beliefs and commercial speech is not, therefore, entitled to protection); see
also Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communica-
tions by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1229, 1246-48 (1991)
(corporation's right to speak is entirely derivative of the listener's right to receive informa-
tion because corporations are purely utilitarian organizations).
116. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 103, at 639.
117. Kozinski and Banner argue that Virginia Pharmacy rejected the profit motive as a
basis for distinguishing commercial speech from other speech. See Kozinski & Banner,
supra note 103, at 639-40. But Virginia Pharmacy simply says that the existence of a profit
motive does not disqualify a speaker from First Amendment protection. See Virginia Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 762. It does not follow that in identifying the interests that must be
balanced, the Court should ignore the interests a speaker obviously has and attribute to
her interests she may not have. Virginia Pharmacy observes that "advertising is the sine
qua non of commercial profits," 425 U.S. at 771 n.24, but it seems equally true that profits
are the sine qua non of commercial advertising.
118. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by
far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.").
119. There is nothing in Virginia Pharmacy or Bates that suggests a retreat from Bige-
low's statement that "whether it calls speech 'commercial' or 'commercial advertising' or
'solicitation'-a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at
5. The Rest of the Court
Justice Blackmun had seven votes for his opinions in Bigelow and
Virginia Pharmacy. In Bates that number dwindled to five, but neither
Justice Powell, who wrote the principal dissent, nor Chief Justice Bur-
ger questioned Justice Blackmun's balancing approach. 2 Rather,
Justice Powell thought the majority "fail[ed] to give appropriate
weight" to the ways advertising of professional services differed from
advertising of products.' 21 From Bigelow through Bates, only Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the Court's approach. He thought the line
drawn in Chrestensen between commercial and noncommercial speech
"was constitutionally sound and practically workable."''
It is worth pausing for a moment to examine Justice Rehnquist's
Virginia Pharmacy dissent because elements of it would later find
their way into Justice Powell's majority opinions and Justice Rehn-
quist's own majority opinion in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co.'" Justice Rehnquist argued that plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment challenge should be treated no differently than a substantive due
process claim.'2 4 If a legislature could decide to ban a product, he
suggested, surely it could take the lesser step of banning its advertis-
ing." Balancing the pros and cons of advertising by pharmacists
"should presumptively be the concern of the Virginia Legislature,"' 26
and it was a mistake for the Court to "overrule[ ] a legislative determi-
nation that such advertising should not be allowed."' 27 Thus, while
Justice Rehnquist invoked Justice Black," s his approach was pure
Frankfurter. 129
stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation." Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
120. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,389 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting);
id. at 386 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
121. Id. at 391 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
124. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955)). For an elaboration of this argument, see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 66, at 25-
40.
125. See Virginia Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Both Congress
and state legislatures have by law sharply limited the permissible dissemination of informa-
tion about some commodities because of the potential harm resulting from those commod-
ities, even though they were not thought to be sufficiently demonstrably harmful to
warrant outright prohibition of their sale.").
126. Id at 783 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 784, 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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B. Second Class Speech: The Era of Central Hudson
Despite its near unanimity with respect to the analytic approach
in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates, the Court shifted dramati-
cally over the next three Terms. In a series of opinions by Justice Pow-
ell, it abandoned Justice Blackmun's balancing approach in favor of a
more categorical one. This new approach culminated in Central Hud-
son and its adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard for restric-
tions on commercial speech, which still remains the Court's position.
1. The Shift Begins: Ohralik and Friedman
The shift towards a categorical approach began in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association.3 ' Ohralik involved the in-person solicita-
tion of accident victims by an attorney-what Justice Marshall called a
"classic example[ ] of 'ambulance chasing.' "131 Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell held that the State could adopt a prophylactic ban
against such solicitation. 32 The result was not remarkable and was
consistent with the Court's past focus on the interests of the listener:
"Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information
and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicita-
tion may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response,
without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection.
''133
But analytically, Ohralik marked a dramatic departure from Justice
Blackmun's approach. Where Virginia Pharmacy had noted that an
individual consumer's interest in commercial speech "may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate,' 34 Ohralik concluded that commercial speech occupied a
"subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.' 35
Justice Powell bolstered this assertion with three main arguments.
First, he observed that there was a "'commonsense' distinction be-
tween speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other vari-
eties of speech.' 1 36 Second, he argued that "[t]o require a parity of
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech
130. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
131. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
132. See id. at 464-67.
133. Id. at 457; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 433
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("A listener also has little interest in being coerced into
a purchasing decision.").
134. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
135. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
136. Id. at 455-56.
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alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of
the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech."' 37 And finally, he noted that the Court had already allowed
"modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-
commercial expression.' 138
The first argument quoted the Virginia Pharmacy majority but
had more in common with Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Justice Black-
mun's "commonsense" distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech did not turn on the fact that commercial speech was
traditionally subject to government regulation, but on the fact that at
least some commercial speech was verifiable and durable and would
not, therefore, be discouraged by government regulation. 3 9 Justice
Powell's point was quite different-that the State was mostly regulat-
ing business, not speech. "A lawyer's procurement of remunerative
employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amend-
ment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic
and professional regulation."' 40 This argument closely resembled Jus-
tice Rehnquist's position that commercial speech claims should be
treated like substantive due process claims.' 4 '
Justice Powell's second argument-that parity with noncommer-
cial speech would dilute the protection accorded noncommercial
speech-reflects a misunderstanding of Justice Blackmun's approach.
Dilution is a danger that inheres in an absolutist or categorical ap-
proach that treats all speech in a given category exactly alike.'4 2 Bal-
ancing does not pose this danger because it allows for case-by-case
calibration of the level of protection. The irony is that Justice Powell
would himself adopt a categorical approach,143 and his placement of
commercial speech in an intermediate category is itself an example of
137. Id. at 456. For a more recent statement of the same argument, see William Van
Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1635 (1996).
138. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
139. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text. Bigelow noted that the relation-
ship of speech to a commercial activity that is subject to regulation "may be one factor,
among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the gov-
ernmental interest alleged," 421 U.S. at 826, but it did not put commercial speech in a
separate category. See id. ("'a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights
by mere labels"').
140. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459; see also id. at 457 ("In-person solicitation by a lawyer of
remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component.").
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
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the dilution tendency of categorical approaches. Justice Powell appar-
ently saw categories as the only alternatives: he could either put com-
mercial and noncommercial speech in the same category and afford
them the same protection or put them in different categories and af-
ford them different protection. The option he ignored, without expla-
nation, was the balancing approach that Justice Blackmun had
actually used in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates.
Justice Powell's third argument-that the Court had treated com-
mercial speech differently in the past-rested on the same misunder-
standing. If one recognizes that the Court's prior cases employed a
balancing approach, then the fact that the Court allowed "modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression"'" simply reflects the differing balance of interests in the
commercial context. It is only if one thinks exclusively in terms of
categories that a greater degree of regulation becomes evidence of a
less protected status.'45 Thus, implicit in Justice Powell's judgment
that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position," was the
categorical treatment of commercial speech that would become mani-
fest in Friedman and Central Hudson.46
Justice Blackmun joined Justice Powell in Ohralik, presumably
because he thought permitting coercive commercial speech was not in
the interests of the listener.14 7 But he dissented the following Term in
Friedman v. Rogers. 48 Friedman upheld a Texas law prohibiting the
practice of optometry under a trade name.149 There was certainly
nothing coercive about trade names, but Justice Powell thought they
were potentially misleading because they did not reveal an optome-
144. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
145. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 433-34 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). (The Court's "'lesser protection"' of commercial speech "did
not rest.., on the fact that commercial speech 'is of less constitutional moment than other
forms of speech' . . . Rather, it reflected the fact that the listener's First Amendment
interests, from which the protection of commercial speech largely derives, allow for certain
specific kinds of government regulation.").
146. Justice Powell's approach differed from Justice Blackmun's not just in theory but
in practice. Justice Powell gave the arguments in favor of the solicitation ban only limited
scrutiny and, in fact, resurrected several of the justifications dismissed in Bates. For exam-
ple, Justice Powell relied on the State's interests in preventing a lawyer from "stirring up
litigation" and "subordinat[ing] the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary inter-
ests." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460-61 & n.19. Compare Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 376 (1977) ("we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action"); id. at 368-69 (rejecting argument
that profit motive erodes professionalism).
147. See supra note 133.
148. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
149. See id. at 15-16.
trist's identity.' ° Justice Powell added for good measure that "[t]he
use of a trade name ... facilitates the advertising essential to large-
scale commercial practices with numerous branch offices, conduct
which the State rationally may wish to discourage while not prohibit-
ing commercial optometrical practice altogether."'' 1
Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice Powell on both points.
First, he argued that the Court ignored the fact that trade names could
provide valuable information to a consumer, who would associate cer-
tain standards of price and quality with a particular name.'5 2 If the
State were concerned that concealing the name of the optometrist was
deceptive, it could require disclosure of the optometrist's name in ad-
dition to the trade name. 3 Second, he maintained that the notion
that the greater power to ban commercial optometry includes the
lesser power to prohibit its advertisement was antithetical to one of
the central themes of Virginia Pharmacy: that the state could not ma-
nipulate the information available to consumers to protect them from
activities that it had decided not to regulate directly.'54 Indeed, the
greater-power-lesser-power argument was yet another element of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's Virginia Pharmacy dissent that Justice Powell had
now adopted.'55
The categorical nature of Justice Powell's approach also became
clearer in Friedman. Relying on Virginia Pharmacy's footnote 24, Jus-
tice Powell concluded that noncommercial speech "is categorically dif-
ferent from the mere solicitation of patronage implicit in a trade
name." 56 Justice Powell also began to erect walls around the cate-
gory of commercial speech by warning the lower courts that "[o]ur
decisions dealing with more traditional First Amendment problems do
not extend automatically to this as yet uncharted area."'157 Justice
Blackmun protested this shift. In past commercial speech cases, he
observed, "the Court has balanced the public and private interests
that the First Amendment protects against the justifications proffered
by the State. Without engaging in any rigid categorization of the de-
gree of scrutiny required, the Court has distinguished between pernls-
150. See id. at 12-13.
151. Id. at 13.
152. See id. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 24-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
155. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
156. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11 n.10 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 10 n.9.
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sible and impermissible forms of state regulation."' 58 But his protest
went unheeded, and the categorical approach foreshadowed in
Ohralik and Friedman crystallized the following Term in Central
Hudson.
2. Formalizing the Categorical Approach: Central Hudson
In Central Hudson,'59 the Court struck down a New York regula-
tion banning ads that promoted the use of electricity. The case pro-
vided Justice Powell an opportunity to formalize his categorical
approach by announcing a four-part, intermediate-scrutiny test appli-
cable only to commercial speech.' 60
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activ-
ity and not be misleading. Next we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield posi-
tive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.16
1
Justice Powell justified this lower level of scrutiny with the arguments
articulated in Ohralik 62
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court's new test because it did
"not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, nonco-
158. Id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
160. Justice Powell also attempted to broaden the definition of "commercial speech" to
encompass all "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." Id. at 561. But this definition did not stick, and the Court subsequently re-
turned to the Pittsburgh Press formulation-speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385; see City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993).
161. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. While Central Hudson's intermediate-scrutiny
test ultimately requires a court to balance the rights of the speaker against the govern-
ment's interests, Central Hudson's approach is categorical (and different from Justice
Blackmun's) because the test to be applied depends on an initial categorization of the
speech as commercial or noncommercial. See supra note 15.
162. First, commercial speech "'occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation."' Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56). Sec-
ond, commercial speech "is of less constitutional moment than other forms of speech." Id.
at 562 n.5. Compare Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (holding that commercial speech occupies a
"subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"). And third, failing to dis-
tinguish between the two "'could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force
of the [First] Amendment's guarantee"' with respect to noncommercial speech. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456). For a discussion of these
arguments, see supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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ercive commercial speech.' 1 63 In contrast to Friedman, however, he
did not focus on the categorical nature of Justice Powell's approach.
Rather, he emphasized the fact that it left "open the possibility that
the State may suppress advertising of electricity in order to lessen de-
mand for electricity" if necessary to serve the State's interest in con-
servation. 164 It "strikes at the heart of the First Amendment," Justice
Blackmun wrote, "because it is a covert attempt by the State to ma-
nipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regula-
tion, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a
free choice."'1 65
3. Watering-Down Central Hudson. Posadas
Although one of the supposed advantages of a categorical ap-
proach is its ability to protect speech by restricting the ability of
judges to defer to the legislature,' 66 Central Hudson proved highly
manipulable. The most extreme example of this is Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.167 At issue in Posadas was a Puerto
Rican statute prohibiting the advertisement of casino gambling aimed
at residents of Puerto Rico-a classic example of government seeking
to discourage an activity it had decided not to ban by prohibiting its
advertisement. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist upheld the
statute, infusing deference to the legislature into every prong of Cen-
tral Hudson.
Justice Rehnquist found that Puerto Rico's interest in discourag-
ing casino gambling was substantial because of the "legislature's be-
lief" that it was substantial and because other jurisdictions had banned
casino gambling entirely. 68 Echoing one of the themes of his Virginia
Pharmacy dissent, 6 9 he wrote that "the greater power to completely
ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban ad-
vertising of casino gambling."' 7 0 Justice Rehnquist showed the same
deference in applying the final two parts of Central Hudson. A re-
163. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Jus-
tice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented because he viewed the Court's test as afford-
ing commercial speech a level of protection "that is virtually indistinguishable from that of
noncommercial speech." Id. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
165. Id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
167. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
168. See id. at 341.
169. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
170. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
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striction would be held to "'directly advance"171 the government's
interest if the legislature's belief that it would do so was "reason-
able."'1 72 And in considering whether the restriction was more exten-
sive than necessary, Justice Rehnquist refused to consider whether
counterspeech to discourage residents from casino gambling would be
a less restrictive alternative. That decision was "up to the legisla-
ture." 73 If, as Justice Rehnquist suggested, each prong of Central
Hudson could be satisfied so long as the legislature's judgment was
reasonable, it was difficult to distinguish this test from rational basis
review.174
C. Rediscovering the Value of Commercial Speech: Discovery
Network
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,75 was the logical
result of the Court's decision to treat commercial speech as a separate
and subordinate category. Cincinnati wanted to reduce the number of
newsracks on its city streets, so it banned all commercial newsracks on
the theory that commercial speech was less valuable. As Justice
Blackmun put it, "[i]n this case, Central Hudson's chickens have come
home to roost.' ' 76
Having come eyeball to eyeball with a city that wished to ban
commercial speech for no other reason than its lower value, the Court
blinked. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court invalidated the
ordinance, stating that "the city's argument attaches more importance
to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of com-
mercial speech."' 77 Discovery Network applied Central Hudson far
more strictly than Posadas. Moreover, the Court's refusal to rely on
the supposed lesser value of commercial speech obliterated the central
171. See id. at 342 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511
(plurality)).
172. See id.
173. Id. at 344; see also Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (holding that the final prong of the Central Hudson test requires only
a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends).
174. See generally Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas
and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1931
(1992).
175. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
176. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 419.
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justification for Central Hudson's treatment of commercial speech as a
separate category.
Justice Steven's ostensible reason for invalidating the ban on
commercial newsracks was that the city had failed to establish that
there was a "reasonable fit" between the ban and its interests in safety
and esthetics.178 The benefit to the city was minimal. 1 7 9 Commercial
newsracks were "no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted
to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks,"' 8 and, in fact, noncommercial
newsracks were "arguably the greater culprit because of their superior
number."'' In short, unless Cincinnati was concerned about charac-
teristics of commercial newsracks in particular, it would have to treat
all newsracks alike.
To reach this conclusion, of course, Justice Stevens had to reject
Cincinnati's argument that the supposed low value of commercial
speech was itself a valid reason for distinguishing among newsracks.
Justice Stevens attacked this argument in two ways. First, he pointed
to "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin com-
mercial speech in a distinct category."182 He noted it is clear that
"much of the material in ordinary newspapers is commercial speech
and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents' promo-
tional publications is not what we have described as 'core' commercial
speech. There is no doubt a 'commonsense' basis for distinguishing
between the two, but ... the difference is a matter of degree."' 83 Sec-
ond, Justice Stevens found Cincinnati's reliance on the distinction un-
availing because "the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to
the particular interests that the city has asserted."'' "[T]he typical
reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental
regulation than noncommercial speech," he said, was the State's "in-
terest in preventing commercial harms" flowing from that speech.' 85
In a footnote, he suggested that restrictions on commercial speech not
"aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular adverse
178. See iL at 417.
179. Only 62 of the 1,500-2,000 newsracks in Cincinnati were commercial. See Discov-
ery Network, 507 U.S. at 418.
180. Id. at 425.
181. Id. at 426.
182. Id. at 419. This had long been a concern of Justice Stevens. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,579-83 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in the judgment); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81-
83 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423.
184. lId at 424.
185. Id. at 426.
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effects stemming from that content" should be "evaluated under the
standards applicable to regulations of fully protected speech.' 8 6
Although Justice Stevens invoked the terminology of Central
Hudson, his opinion in Discovery Network was in many ways a return
to the balancing approach of Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and
Bates."w First, Discovery Network suggested that rigid categorization
of commercial speech is difficult and that the difference between a
newspaper and a commercial publication is "a matter of degree."18
Second, the decision rejected the notion that government may treat
commercial speech differently merely on the grounds that it is less
valuable."'18 9 Third, the decision suggested that a State may only re-
strict commercial speech because of some particular characteristic of
that speech and that the Court would subject regulations of commer-
cial speech aimed at achieving other purposes to strict scrutiny.'19 Fi-
nally, Justice Stevens' decision reached its conclusion not by placing
the speech at issue in a particular category, but by balancing the First
Amendment interests at stake (the complete suppression of commer-
cial newsracks) against the State's interest (removing 62 out of more
than 1,500 newsracks). 191
Although Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' opinion, he
also wrote separately to call for the abandoning of Central Hudson. In
Justice Blackmun's view, there was "no reason to treat truthful com-
mercial speech as a class that is less 'valuable' than noncommercial
186. Id. at 416 n.11.
187. Justice Stevens tends to prefer balancing approaches. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court - Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 HARv. L. Rv. 22, 88 (1992) ("Justice Stevens has long favored sliding-scale
approaches over categorical rule-bound approaches.").
188. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (suggesting "that no
line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite
kind could ever be drawn").
189. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419, 428. Compare Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 763 (consumer's interest "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in
the day's most urgent political debate").
190. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11. Compare Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("We have not suggested that the 'com-
monsense differences' between commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scru-
tiny of restraints that suppress truthful, nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial speech.").
191. Predictably, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. He warned against "'allowing indi-
vidual judges in city after city to second-guess such.., legislative ... determinations' on
such matters as esthetics." Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
White and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
570 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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speech."'192 The Court had permitted greater regulation of misleading
and coercive commercial speech and speech about illegal activities be-
cause the listener's interest in receiving such speech was minimal.193
The Central Hudson Court's mistake was to suggest that the expanded
speech regulation it allowed was an indication of commercial speech's
subordinate value generally rather than a reflection of the listener's
reduced interest in receiving certain kinds of commercial speech. 94
By subordinating commercial speech generally, the Court had invited
precisely the sort of regulation that Cincinnati had imposed. 195
Justice Blackmun also questioned Ohralik's dilution argument.
"The very fact that government remains free.., to ensure that com-
mercial speech is not deceptive or coercive, to prohibit commercial
speech proposing illegal activities, and to impose reasonably time,
place, or manner restrictions on commercial speech greatly reduces
the risk that protecting commercial speech will dilute the level of First
Amendment protection for speech generally."'196 Because the balanc-
ing approach he had always advocated permitted courts to give appro-
priate weight to government interests, protecting commercial speech
would not drag down the level of protection for speech in other
circumstances.
Discovery Network marked a turning point in the Court's com-
mercial speech jurisprudence. By rejecting the notion that commer-
cial speech is inherently less valuable than noncommercial speech, the
Court removed the main pillar supporting Central Hudson's analytic
framework. As I further discuss below, 97 five members of the current
Court subsequently expressed their dissatisfaction with Central Hud-
son, indicating that they might be willing to abandon its approach to
commercial speech if only they could decide what should replace it. 98
In Part III, I will argue that Justice Blackmun's listener-oriented bal-
ancing approach provides the best alternative to Central Hudson,199
but first I will look at how Justice Blackmun applied the same ap-
proach to public forums.
192. Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
193. See hi at 432-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
194. See id. at 433-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
195. See id at 435-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 438 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
197. See infra notes 331-36 and accompanying text.
198. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
199. See infra notes 343-70 and accompanying text.
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II. Public Forum
Another significant development in First Amendment law during
Justice Blackmun's time on the Supreme Court was the articulation of
a highly structured public forum jurisprudence. The Court had con-
sidered cases involving expressive activity on government property
since the 1930s,2°° but it was not until the 1970s that it began to ask if
the property in question was a "public forum."201 As the author of
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,2 "2 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad,"3 and Burson v. Freeman,2 4 Justice Blackmun helped shape
the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine, while his objection in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund"°5 to the
Court's categorical approach has helped build opposition to that as-
pect of the Court's doctrine.
As in the commercial speech area, Justice Blackmun has advo-
cated a balancing approach that emphasizes the listener's interests.
Though the commitment to balancing is clearest in his Cornelius dis-
sent,20 6 it also appears in Lehman, his first public-forum opinion." 7
Justice Blackmun's concern for the listener is also evident in Lehman,
where the Justice allowed a public transit system to ban political ads
200. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
201. The phrase "public forum" emerged from a 1965 article by Harry Kalven, see
Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rnv. 1,
and was picked up by the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972) ("Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to
say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may
not be justified by reference to content alone.").
202. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality).
203. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
204. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality).
205. 473 U.S. 788, 813-33 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
54 (1966) (dissenting opinion) (a "person's right to speak and the interests that such speech
serves for society as a whole must be balanced against the 'other interests inhering in the
uses to which the public property is normally put."')); id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
result of such balancing will depend, of course, upon the nature and strength of the various
interests, which in turn depend upon such factors as the nature of the property, the rela-
tionship between the property and the message the speaker wishes to convey, and any
special features of the forum that make it especially desirable or undesirable for the partic-
ular expressive activity.").
207. See 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (plurality) ("the nature of the forum and the conflicting
interests involved have remained important in determining the degree of protection af-
forded by the [First] Amendment to the speech in question.").
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out of concern for the "captive audience;"2 °8 in Conrad, where he
overturned a municipal theater's decision to bar the musical "Hair"
because "[t]here was no captive audience;"20 9 and in Burson, where he
upheld a ban on campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place on
election day to allow voters a final moment for thought before they
entered a polling place.210
The more categorical approach adopted by the Court in Perry2l'
and Cornelius,1 2 which divides government property into "public fo-
rums," "limited public forums," and "nonpublic forums,' 213 has
proved less protective of speech than Justice Blackmun's approach.
The culprit has not been the dynamic of dilution seen in the commer-
cial speech area,21 4 but rather the dynamic of narrowing-the ten-
dency to define categories narrowly because every case within a
category is supposed to be treated the same way.215 Thus, the Court
has limited "public forums" to places like streets and parks, places
which have "'immemorially... been held in the public trust and used
for purposes of expressive activity,' "216 and has defined "limited pub-
lic forums" by reference to the government's intent, so that the gov-
ernment's exclusion of a particular speaker establishes that the
government has not created a "limited public forum. '217 The dynamic
of narrowing inherent in the Court's categorical approach to public
forums has turned a doctrine that was designed to open government
property for expressive activity into a tool for closing it.
A. Early Extremes: Lehman and Conrad
Although the Supreme Court had used the phrase "public forum"
in a previous opinion,21 8 Lehman was the first case in which the Court
gave the concept "serious and divisive doctrinal attention. 2 1 9 In a
208. Id. at 302 (plurality) (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
209. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 556.
210. Burson, 504 U.S. at 210.
211. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
212. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Edue. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
213. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
214. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
216. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992) (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939)) (concluding
that airport terminals are not public forums).
217. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03.
218. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
219. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1734 (1987).
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plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun held that the City of Shaker
Heights did not have to accept political advertising on its municipal
rapid transit system even though it regularly accepted commercial and
public-service ads. He began by noting that the passengers on public
transportation were "'a captive audience.' ' '220  "[V]iewers of bill-
boards and streetcar signs had no 'choice or volition' to observe such
advertising and had the message 'thrust upon them by all the arts and
devices that skill can produce.' '"221 "These situations," the Justice
concluded, "are different from the traditional settings where First
Amendment values inalterably prevail."'222
What was needed was balancing: "the nature of the forum and
the conflicting interests involved have remained important in deter-
mining the degree of protection afforded by the [First] Amendment to
the speech in question."2' Yet, Justice Blackmun did not subject the
government's interests to the same "close inspection" that he would in
the commercial speech cases.224 In fact, he suggested that because the
city was acting as the proprietor of a "commercial venture," its deci-
sions should be upheld so long as they were not "arbitrary, capricious,
or invidious."2'
Although the city had an interest in protecting the "captive audi-
ence," that interest would not support a distinction between commer-
cial and political ads unless the two were in some way different. Thus,
Justice Blackmun fell back on the notion that political ads were more
"controversial. '226 Because they might jeopardize the revenue the
city earned from the advertising, offend the city's passengers, raise
concerns about favoritism, and lead to problems in parceling out
space, it was reasonable for the city to prohibit them.227 These rea-
sons are not particularly convincing and, indeed, Justice Blackmun
would later reject them himself.2'
220. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302 (quoting Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,
468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
221. Id. at 302 (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 302-03.
224. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
225. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303.
226. Id. at 304.
227. See id.
228. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 822, 829-30 (1985); infra notes 263-70 and accompanying
In Conrad,229 Justice Blackmun again authored the majority opin-
ion. This time, however, he ruled against the government and was
joined by the dissenters in Lehman. Conrad held that the directors of
two municipal theaters could not deny an application to perform the
rock musical "Hair" without complying with the procedural safe-
guards for prior restraints.2 0 Central to this holding was Justice
Blackmun's conclusion that the municipal theaters at issue "were pub-
lic forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities."'" Be-
cause the theaters were perfectly compatible with the musical, the
rejection was not based on competing applications from other users,
and "[t]here was no captive audience, ' '232 there was no reason to defer
to the directors' decision.
There was obviously some tension between Conrad and Lehman.
Like the city in Lehman, the municipal theater directors in Conrad
were acting in a proprietary capacity. As Justice Rehnquist pointed
out in dissent, Chattanooga was "not prohibiting or penalizing the ex-
pression of views in dramatic form by its citizens at large, but rather
managing its municipal auditorium." 3  What seemed to distinguish
Conrad from Lehman in Justice Blackmun's mind was the absence of
a captive audience. Even if "Hair" was not family entertainment, no
one was being forced to go see it.
Lehman and Conrad have been criticized for adopting a categori-
cal, "all or nothing" approach to public forums." 4 If there is no public
forum, as in Lehman, blatant content discrimination is permissible; if
there is a public forum, as in Conrad, an opera house may not limit
itself to operas. Certainly the dramatically different results of these
cases are consistent with a categorical approach. But Lehman is a bal-
ancing opinion that notes the need to consider "the conflicting inter-
ests involved" in order to determine "the degree of protection
afforded by the [First] Amendment." 5 Conrad also suggests that de-
229. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
230. See id, at 558-62.
231. Id. at 555.
232. Id. at 555-56.
233. Id. at 571 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "May a municipal theater devote an entire
season to Shakespeare," he asked, "or is it required to book any potential producer on a
first come, first served basis?" Id. at 573.
234. See Kenneth L. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 247,252 (1976); Post, supra note 219,
at 1734-39.
235. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-03; see supra note 223 and accompanying text. As Robert
Post has pointed out, it was Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lehman that attempted
to outline a categorical public-forum approach. See Post, supra, note 219, at 1737 ("Bren-
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spite the theaters' status as public forums, the case might have turned
out differently had the city been able to show that the facilities were
not suited to the production, that they were subject to competing de-
mands, or that there was a captive audience." 6 The better explana-
tion of Lehman and Conrad is that the balancing of conflicting
interests placed them at opposite ends of a continuum, not that the
Justice who would be such an advocate of balancing in commercial
speech cases was a rigid categorizer when it came to public forums.
Still, Justice Blackmun was slower to voice his opposition as the
Court moved to a rigid, categorical approach than he had been in the
commercial speech area. Although Justice Brennan abandoned the
idea of a categorical approach to public forums as early as Greer v.
Spock,7 Justice Blackmun voted mostly with the majority in public
forum cases until his dissent in Cornelius.38 The main developments
in the Court's public forum jurisprudence during this period were the
recognition of an intermediate category of "limited public forums"' 39
and the formal adoption of a three category approach in Perry Educa-
tion Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.24 °
Perry divided all public property into three categories, with differ-
ent rules for each. In the first category were "quintessential public
forums" like streets and parks, "which by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."24' In such pub-
lic forums, "the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are
sharply circumscribed" and content-based exclusions would be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. 42 In the second categorywere "'limited'
public forum[s],' ' 4 3 "which the State has opened for use by-the public
as a place for expressive activity." 2" Although the State is not re-
quired to maintain a limited public forum indefinitely, "so long as it
does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
nan's larger project ... was to distinguish two generic kinds of government property...
subject to distinct regimes of first amendment regulation.").
236. See Conrad, 420 U.S. at 555-56.
237. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Post, supra note 219, at 1744-45.
238. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. See Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167 (1976); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
240. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
241. Id at 45.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 48.
244. Id. at 45.
public forum."'2 45 In the third category were nonpublic forums,
"[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication."24 6 In a nonpublic forum, regulations need
only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's views. '  Justice White
concluded that the school mail system at issue in Perry was a nonpub-
lic forum, and that it was therefore permissible for the school district
to allow only one teachers union to use the mail system because that
union was the teachers' collective bargaining representative. 24
Though Justice Brennan dissented in Perry and repeated his
Greer arguments against a categorical approach,2 49 Justice Blackmun
was apparently not moved for he joined Justice White's opinion with-
out comment. That would change in Cornelius, however, where Jus-
tice Blackmun dissented from the Court's evisceration of the limited
public forum and, in the process, presented an extended critique of
the Court's categorical approach.
B. Dissenting from a Jurisprudence of Labels: Cornelius
At issue in Cornelius250 was the federal government's policy of
excluding advocacy groups from the Combined Federal Campaign
(CFC), a charity drive aimed at federal employees. Some of these
groups argued that they could not be excluded from the CFC because
it was a limited public forum for charitable solicitations. Justice
O'Connor rejected that argument in a four to three decision."s  For
Justice O'Connor, the key to whether the government had created a
limited public forum was its intent: "The government does not create
a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only
by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public dis-
course."'-52 The CFC was not a limited public forum because "[t]he
245. Id. at 46. Relying on Widmar and Madison, however, Justice White stated that a
limited public forum "may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups
or for the discussion of certain subjects." Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted). There is a ten-
sion between recognizing that public forums may be created for a limited purpose and
stating that the same standards apply to limited public forums as apply in a traditional
public forum. One of the principles that applies in a traditional public forum is that con-
tent-based exclusions are subject to strict scrutiny, see id. at 45, yet to create a forum for
the discussion of certain subjects is necessarily to make content-based exclusions.
246. Id. at 46.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 46, 51-52.
249. See id. at 63 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
251. Justices Marshall and Powell did not participate.
252. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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Government's consistent policy has been to limit participation in the
CFC to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies.'1
53
Justice Blackmun dissented vigorously from what he saw as the
evisceration of the limited public forum concept. By focusing on in-
tent, he wrote:
[t]he Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum
restricted to a particular class of speakers is a limited public fo-
rum. If the Government does not create a limited public forum
unless it intends to provide an "open forum" for expressive ac-
tivity, and if the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the
Government did not intend to create such a forum, no speaker
challenging denial of access will ever be able to prove that the
forum is a limited public forum. 4
Thus, the Court "empties the limited-public-forum concept of mean-
ing and collapses the three categories of public forum, limited public
forum, and nonpublic forum into two."'' 5
But Justice Blackmun did not simply criticize the court for failing
to keep its categories straight; he also questioned the entire enterprise
of dividing government property into categories. In passages reminis-
cent of Bigelow and Friedman, 6 he argued that proper resolution of
public-forum cases turned not on the label applied but on balancing
the underlying interests.
The result of such balancing will depend, of course, upon the
nature and strength of the various interests, which in turn de-
pend upon such factors as the nature of the property, the rela-
tionship between the property and the message the speaker
wishes to convey, and any special features of the forum that
make it especially desirable or undesirable for the particular ex-
pressive activity. Broad generalizations about the proper bal-
ance are, for the most part, impossible. The Court has stated
one firm guideline, however: the First Amendment does not
guarantee that one may engage in expressive activity on govern-
ment property when the expressive activity would be incompati-
ble with important purposes of the property. 7
253. Id. at 804. Because the CFC was a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of advocacy
groups would be upheld if reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. In concluding that the exclu-
sion of advocacy groups was reasonable, Justice O'Connor invoked the full panoply of
justifications found in Lehman: the government's status as proprietor; the fear of being
overwhelmed with claims of access; the appearance of favoritism; and the assertion that the
participation of advocacy groups jeopardized the success of the Campaign. See id. at 805,
809-10. Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974)
(plurality).
254. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 67-69, 158 and accompanying text.
257. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Yes, the Court had divided forums into three categories, but the lines
between them were blurry and "really more in the nature of a contin-
uum than a definite demarcation."" 8 "Thus, the public forum, lim-
ited-public-forum, and nonpublic forum categories are but analytic
shorthand" for the balancing of interests- s9 Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach was flawed because it "simply labels the property and dis-
penses with the balancing. ' 260
Under the approach articulated in Justice Blackmun's Cornelius
dissent, the government may avoid opening its property for expressive
activity when "expressive activity is not compatible with the normal
uses of the property. '261 This is not a categorical rule, however. His
dissent suggests that even if the property is compatible with expressive
activity, a court must still weigh the government's interests against the
speaker's.262 Justice Blackmun's analysis of the government's inter-
ests in Cornelius, though, shows none of Lehman's deference to the
government. Indeed, the same justifications that Justice Blackmun
found sufficient in Lehman he now found wanting. In Lehman Justice
Blackmun had relied on the city's role as the proprietor of a rapid
transit system,263 but in Cornelius he wrote that "the mere fact that
the Government acts as property owner should not exempt it from the
First Amendment. '264 In Lehman he had pointed to the city's interest
in avoiding the appearance of favoritism,2 65 but in Cornelius he re-
jected that justification and suggested that "a simple disclaimer in the
brochure would ... suffice to achieve the Government's interest in
avoiding the appearance of support. 2 66 In Lehman he thought the
city's decision to limit car card space to "innocuous and less contro-
versial" advertising was reasonable,267 but in Cornelius he wrote that
the exclusion of a particular expressive activity must be justified "'by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."' 268 Fi-
nally, in Lehman he speculated that accepting political advertising
258. Id. at 819 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 820 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261. 1& at 820 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
263. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04.
264. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 822 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality).
266. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 829 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality).
268. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 829-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
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could jeopardize advertising revenue,269 but in Cornelius he noted that
"the evidence shows that contributions to the CFC increased during
each of the years respondents participated in the Campaign."2 0
C. Return of the Captive Audience: Burson
Justice Blackmun's last public forum opinion was Burson v. Free-
man,271 in which he upheld the constitutionality of Tennessee's prohi-
bition against campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. He
noted that, because the streets and sidewalks covered by the prohibi-
tion were "quintessential public forums," 7 2 the prohibition would
have to survive strict scrutiny: "The State must show that the 'regula-
tion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end."' 73 Justice Blackmun did not,
however, "simply label[ ] the property and dispense[ ] with the balanc-
ing.",274 Nor did he apply a categorical incompatibility test. Indeed, if
he had the case would have come out differently since expressive ac-
tivities are not incompatible with the normal uses of sidewalks.
Rather, he warned:
Despite the ritualistic ease with which we state this now-familiar
[strict-scrutiny] standard, its announcement does not allow us to
avoid the truly difficult issues involving the First Amendment.
Perhaps foremost among these serious issues are cases that force
us to reconcile our commitment to free speech with our commit-
ment to other constitutional rights embodied in government
proceedings. 7 5
The conflict Justice Blackmun saw was between the rights of the
speaker and the rights of the listener exercising her constitutional
right to vote. Tennessee had a compelling interest both in "'preserv-
ing the integrity of its election process' by preventing fraud and in
"protecting voters from confusion and undue influence."276 In Justice
Blackmun's view, the campaign-free zone protected the listener's in-
terests without unduly impinging upon the speaker's. As the Justice
noted, "[lt 'takes approximately 15 seconds to walk 75 feet.' The
269. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality).
270. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 830 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
271. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality).
272. Id- at 197.
273. See id- at 198 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
274. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
276. Id. at 199 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 228-29, 231 (1989)).
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State of Tennessee has decided that these last 15 seconds before its
citizens enter the polling place should be their own, as free from inter-
ference as possible. We do not find that this is an unconstitutional
choice. 2
77
Burson's emphasis on the interests of the listener is consistent
with Justice Blackmun's opinions in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and
Lehman.278 Indeed, in some ways, Burson brings his public forum ju-
risprudence full circle to Lehman-though its result is more defensi-
ble than Lehman's. 9 In Burson, as in Lehman, Justice Blackmun's
chief concern was with the "captive audience" and the listener's right,
under limited circumstances, not to receive information.
As I discuss further below, the Court's categorical, public-forum
jurisprudence has attracted a good deal of criticism from both on and
off the Court. 0 Justice Kennedy, in particular, has urged the Court
to concentrate less on labels and history and more on the objective
characteristics that make government property compatible or incom-
patible with expressive activity."' Yet Justice Kennedy's approach to
public-forum issues remains a categorical one'm and, as I argue below,
it lacks the flexibility to deal with difficult cases in which the right to
speak in a public forum intrudes too drastically on the listener's inter-
ests. Justice Blackmun's listener-oriented balancing approach pro-
vides a more attractive alternative.3
I. Listening to Justice Blackmun
The Supreme Court's commercial speech and public forum doc-
trines are in need of repair. In the public forum area, the Court's
categorical approach has effectively limited public forums to places
like sidewalks and parks that have historically been available for
277. Id. at 210 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 802 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tenn. 1990) (Fones,
J., dissenting)).
278. See supra notes 61-66, 220-22 and accompanying text.
279. Burson is more defensible than Lehman for two reasons. First, the listener's right
not to hear, which the State seeks to protect, is far more limited-15 seconds on election
day rather than an entire commute every day. Second, Lehman rests on what seems to me
an insupportable assumption that political ads are more intrusive than other ads. See supra
notes 226-28 and accompanying text. Burson also distinguishes among types of speech,
limiting only campaigning and the solicitation of votes, but this distinction relates to the
specific listener's interest at stake-her interest in making a voting decision free from last
minute influence.
280. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
281. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698
(1992) (Kennedy J., concurring in the judgments).
282. See id. at 699.
283. See infra notes 311-24 and accompanying text.
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speech and has allowed the government to make content-based exclu-
sions from other property. It has turned a doctrine that was designed
to open government property for expressive activity into a tool for
closing it, while producing a series of apparently inconsistent results.
In the commercial speech area, at least five members of the Court
appear ready to abandon Central Hudson, but they appear uncertain
about what should take its place.
In this Part, I argue that the Court could gain some needed assist-
ance by listening to Justice Blackmun. The listener-oriented balancing
approach he advocated in both commercial speech and public forum
cases has not only proven more speech-protective than the categorical
alternatives the Court has tried, it also provides the flexibility to deal
with the hard cases that arise when the speaker's and listener's inter-
ests collide. I illustrate my argument by looking at two such "hard
cases"284: (1) restrictions on the speech of protesters on public side-
walks outside abortion clinics; and (2) forced disclosures by commer-
cial speakers, such as the Surgeon General's warning in cigarette
advertisements and the registration requirements of federal securities
law.
A. Public Forum
1. The Current Confusion
The categorical, public-forum doctrine articulated in Perry 5 and
Cornelius 6 has not been very protective of speech. Specifically, it
has encountered the problem of narrowing that is inherent in categori-
cal approaches. Because classifying government property as a public
forum would require the government to allow expressive activity
2 8 7
and would allow the government to exclude particular speakers only
when the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest,288 the Court has defined this category narrowly. It has lim-
ited public forums to places like sidewalks and parks, which "'have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time
284. I use the phrase "hard cases" in the sense that Ashutosh Bhagwat does: "cases
where the law, meaning primarily the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court, appears
to point strongly towards a particular result, and yet, because the result seems unduly harsh
either to an individual or to society at large, it is unpalatable to the reviewing court."
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CoN.
L. REv. 961, 966 (1998).
285. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
286. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
287. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 ("In these quintessential public forums, the government
may not prohibit all communicative activity.").
288. See id; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
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out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,'"29 while
specifically excluding newer forums like airport terminals.2 ° The
Court has also defined the category of "limited public forums" in such
a way as to make it relatively easy for the government to prevail by
using its exclusion of particular speakers as evidence that it did not
intend to create a limited public forum in the first place.291
This restrictive approach has drawn a good deal of criticism. Jus-
tice Kennedy has argued that the "public forum doctrine ought not to
be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert what was
once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the
government authority to restrict speech by fiat.'"2 2 Justice Souter has
added that if the Court continues to be so stingy in defining public
forums, "we might as well abandon the public forum doctrine alto-
gether.'293 Geoffrey Stone has argued that the Court's "myopic focus
on formalistic labels... serves only to distract attention from the real
stakes.
'294
On the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy has taken the lead in
trying to breathe life into the public forum doctrine. He has argued
that public forums should be defined by their objective, physical char-
acteristics: "If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at
issue and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted
289. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Industrial Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939)); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
290. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992) ("given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it
hardly qualifies for the description of having 'immemorially... time out of mind' been
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity").
291. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (finding that the CFC was not a limited public forum
because "[t]he Government's consistent policy has been to limit participation in the CFC
to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies").
On top of this, the Court's categorical public-forum approach has produced a slew of
seemingly inconsistent results. Sidewalks outside embassies, see Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S.
312, 318 (1988), and polling places, see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992), are
public forums, but sidewalks outside post offices are not. See United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720,727-30 (1990) (plurality). Funds to support student activities are "metaphysi-
cal" public forums, see Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995), but
funds to support the arts are not. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S.
Ct. 2168, 2178 (1998). Moreover, candidate debates on public television are not public
forums. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1642 (1998).
292. Lee, 505 U.S. at 693-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
293. Id. at 710 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting).
294. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. C. L. Ruv. 46, 93 (1987);
see also Post, supra note 219, at 1715-16 ("The doctrine has in fact become a serious obsta-
cle not only to sensitive first amendment analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the
government's requirements in controlling its own property.").
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by the government indicate that expressive activity would be appro-
priate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public fo-
rum. '295 He has also extended "limited public forums" to include not
just government property used for expressive activity but also funds
used to support expressive activity.296
Although Justice Kennedy's effort to increase the rigor of the
public forum doctrine by concentrating on the physical characteristics
of the property is a welcome development, his approach remains a
categorical one. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, for example, Justice Kennedy warned that in evaluating
the compatibility of government property with expressive activities, a
court must look at "expressive activities in general, rather than the
specific sort of speech at issue in the case before it; otherwise the anal-
ysis would be one not of classification but rather of case-by-case bal-
ancing. '  Elsewhere Justice Kennedy has expressed "misgivings
about judicial balancing under the First Amendment."2 98 Thus, de-
spite their shared focus on the compatibility of government property
with expressive activity,29 9 Justice Kennedy's public forum approach is
quite different from Justice Blackmun's. Justice Kennedy would
maintain the Court's current categorical approach, but define public
forums more broadly to include all government property that is com-
patible with expressive activity.30 0 Once the property had been
deemed compatible and declared a public forum, he would permit no
further weighing of government interests based on the type of speech
involved.30 ' Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, would replace the
Court's categorical approach with balancing. He would not require
the government to open its property for expressive activity "when the
295. Lee, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
296. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) ("The SAF is a
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles
are applicable."). But see National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2178
(1998) (holding that the NEA is not a public forum).
297. Lee, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
298. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 784 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (objecting to compelling-state-interest test for content based re-
strictions on speech); id. at 127 ("use of... traditional legal categories is preferable to...
ad hoc balancing.").
299. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments); Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 816 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined the part of Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Lee that called for the Court to focus on the objective physical char-
acteristics of the government property.
300. See Lee, 505 U.S. 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
301. See id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
WEIGHING THE LISTENER'S INTERESTS
expressive activity would be incompatible with important purposes of
the property,' 30 2 but even if a property were compatible with speech,
Justice Blackmun would allow a court to consider "the nature and
strength of the various interests,' '30 3 including the listener's inter-
ests.30 4 "Broad generalizations about the proper balance are, for the
most part, impossible. '30 5
Thus, in Burson v. Freeman, Justice Blackmun was able to give
effect to the listener's interest despite the compatibility of sidewalks
with expressive activity and their status as a public forum.30 6 "The
State of Tennessee has decided that [the] last 15 seconds before its
citizens enter the polling place should be their own, as free from inter-
ference as possible. We do not find that this is an unconstitutional
choice. '3 7 Burson was more problematic for those who favored a cat-
egorical approach, for the court had repeatedly declared that side-
walks were traditional public forums308 and they were certainly
compatible with campaigning. Justice Kennedy voted to uphold Ten-
nessee's restriction, but he was forced to make an ad hoc exception
allowing "freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary for
the accommodation of another constitutional right"-voting.3 9 Jus-
tice Scalia, in a further example of the narrowing to which categorical
approaches can lead, voted to uphold the restriction on the ground
that, while sidewalks usually are public forums, sidewalks around pol-
ling places on election day are not.310 Justice Blackmun's balancing
approach offered a more candid, and ultimately more speech-protec-
tive, way of resolving the conflict between the interests of speakers
and those of the listener, which Tennessee's restriction was designed
to protect.
302. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302; Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 210.
305. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
306. Burson, 504 U.S. at 196 (plurality); see supra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
307. Burson, 504 U.S. at 210 (plurality).
308. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
309. Burson, 504 U.S. at 213-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Voting is one of the most
fundamental and cherished liberties in our democratic system of government.").
310. Id. at 214-16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia concluded that
because "the environs of a polling place, on election day, are simply not a 'traditional
public forum,' ... they are subject to speech restrictions that are reasonable and viewpoint
neutral." Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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2. The Problem of Abortion Protesters
Recent cases concerning restrictions on anti-abortion protests on
streets and sidewalks around clinics illustrate the advantages of Justice
Blackmun's listener-oriented balancing approach.3 ' The Court has
tended to uphold buffer zones around the entrances and driveways of
the clinics,312 but has struck down efforts to prevent protesters from
physically approaching patients.31 3
In these cases, the Court has held that injunctions restricting
abortion protests must "burden [no] more speech than necessary to
serve a significant governmental interest." ' 4 According to the Court,
the government has a substantial interest in protecting patients' free-
dom to seek medical services and in protecting them from picketing
that threatens their psychological and physical well-being by raising
their levels of stress.31 ' Yet the Court's recognition of the listener's
interests in these cases has been quite limited. In striking down at-
tempts to prevent protesters from physically approaching patients, the
Court has emphasized "'that in public debate our own citizens must
tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide
adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment" 6 and has expressed doubt that there is any "right of
the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone. 31 17
Though the Court's decisions purport to apply its categorical pub-
lic forum approach-or even a more stringent version of that ap-
proach 318 -the Court's willingness to uphold restrictions on speech in
a traditional public forum suggests at least a degree of balancing.3 19
Under a categorical approach like Justice Kennedy's, even the buffer
zones around the clinic entrances would be difficult to maintain be-
cause such zones restrict speech in a traditional public forum that is
311. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997); Mad-
sen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
312. See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 868-69 (upholding 15 foot buffer zone); Madsen, 512 U.S.
at 768-71 (upholding 36 foot buffer zone).
313. See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 866-68 (striking down 15 foot floating buffer zone
around people entering and leaving the clinic); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773-74 (striking down
300 foot "no approach" zone around clinic).
314. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 865; see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. The Court has charac-
terized this test as "somewhat more stringent" than the test applied to legislation restrict-
ing speech in a public forum. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
315. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-78; see also Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 866.
316. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
317. Schenck, 117 S.Ct. at 870.
318. See supra note 314.
319. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
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perfectly compatible with expressive activities in general.3 2 ° It is thus
no great surprise that Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's dissents,
which argued that there was simply no governmental interest suffi-
cient to survive the strict scrutiny that such restrictions required.3 21
Justice Scalia's treatment of the listener's interest in these cases was
short and to the point: "There is no right to be free of unwelcome
speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from
abortion clinics. 322
Under Justice Blackmun's balancing approach, by contrast, both
the buffer zones around the clinic entrances and driveways and those
that prevent protesters from physically approaching the patients could
be upheld. Although the sidewalks around an abortion clinic are com-
patible with expressive activity in general, the listener's interest in
gaining access to that clinic free from intimidation and harassment
must be weighed as well. I must acknowledge, however, that Justice
Blackmun did not see it quite that way in Madsen, for he joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court. It was thus left to Justice
Stevens to articulate the listener's interest supporting the no-approach
zone. The First Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote, "does not encom-
pass attempts to abuse an unreceptive or captive audience, at least
under the circumstances of this case. ''3 1 A protester does not have
"an unqualified constitutional right to follow and harass an unwilling
listener, especially one on her way to receive medical services."324
The 15 foot floating buffer zone at issue in Schenck, particularly
coupled as it was with the right of two "sidewalk counselors" to enter
that zone unless the patient objected, seems to me a perfectly reason-
able balance between the undoubted right of abortion protesters to
320. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699
(1992) (Kennedy J., concurring) ("courts must consider the consistency of [the property's
other] uses with expressive activities in general, rather than the specific sort of speech at
issue in the case before it; otherwise the analysis would be one not of classification but
rather of case-by-case balancing.").
321. See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 871-78 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 784-815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Kennedy did not write separately to explain why abortion, unlike voting, did
not qualify for the narrow exception that "permits freedom of expression to yield to the
extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right." Burson v. Free-
man, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra note 309 and accompa-
nying text.
322. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 871 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
324. ld. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Strangely, Justice Ste-
vens joined the Chief Justice's opinion in Schenck striking down a seemingly narrower 15
foot floating buffer zone.
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make their views known in a place that clearly has symbolic signifi-
cance for their speech, and the legitimate interests of the listener,
likely in an emotional state, to avoid running a gauntlet of protesters.
In fact, the listener's interest in Schenck in being left alone strikes me
as clearly stronger than those of the voters in Burson in being free of
last minute campaigning. The restrictions in Schenck also seem less
burdensome than the 100 foot "campaign free zone" upheld in
Burson.
If one agrees with me that restrictions on allowing protestors to
physically approach patients trying to enter an abortion clinic are war-
ranted even on public sidewalks, then Justice Blackmun's listener-ori-
ented balancing approach has much to commend it, and one ought to
hesitate before too quickly embracing Justice Kennedy's categorical,
compatibility approach.
B. Commercial Speech
1. The Current Confusion
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Discovery Network32 5
marked a revival of protection for commercial speech. While Justice
Stevens purported to apply the Central Hudson test, his approach had
more in common with Justice Blackmun's opinions in Bigelow, Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, and Bates.326 Moreover, Justice Stevens' opinion ex-
plicitly rejected the notion that commercial speech is inherently less
valuable than noncommercial speech,3 27 thereby removing Central
Hudson's chief justification for putting commercial speech in a less
protected category.
Justice Blackmun wrote separately to call explicitly for the
Supreme Court to abandon Central Hudson,3- and since his retire-
ment the Court has come close to doing just that. In 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island,329 the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute
that prohibited advertising the price of alcoholic beverages. At a min-
imum, 44 Liquormart further strengthened the Court's protection of
commercial speech by overruling Posadas. Rhode Island had argued
that under Posadas its decision as to how it could best promote tem-
325. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
326. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
327. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419 ("the city's argument attaches more impor-
tance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases
warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech.").
328. Id. at 431-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes 192-96 and accompanying
text.
329. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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perance was entitled to deference, and that its "greater" power to ban
alcohol entirely included the "lesser" power to prohibit its advertise-
ment. Justice Stevens replied that "[t]he reasoning in Posadas does
support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now per-
suaded that Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment
analysis."330
But 44 Liquormart also casts significant doubt on the Court's
continued adherence to Central Hudson. Part IV of Justice Stevens'
opinion, which Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined, was highly crit-
ical of Central Hudson's categorical approach. "Rhode Island errs in
concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a sim-
ilar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar
category of expression," Justice Stevens wrote. 3 "[W]hen a State en-
tirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands. '332 Justice
Thomas went further, calling on the Court to abandon Central Hud-
son and return to Justice Blackmun's approach in Virginia Phar-
macy.333 "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting
that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial'
speech.'334 Finally, Justice Scalia wrote that though he "share[d] Jus-
tice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson test,"335 he was
willing to resolve the case by applying Central Hudson because he did
not believe "we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central
330. Id. at 509 (plurality); id. at 510 ("we decline to give force to [Posadas's] highly
deferential approach"); id. at 511 (rejecting the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument).
Justice Stevens's repudiation of Posadas was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, but Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion also rejected Posadas's deferential
interpretation of Central Hudson: "The closer look that we have required since Posadas
comports better with the purpose of the analysis set out in Central Hudson." Id. at 531-32
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
331. Id. at 501 (plurality).
332. Id. (plurality). Justice Stevens ultimately applied the Central Hudson test to
Rhode Island's statute and found that the statute failed. See id. at 504-08 (plurality).
333. See iL at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I
do not join the principal opinion's application of the Central Hudson balancing test be-
cause I do believe that such a test should be applied to a restriction of 'commercial'
speech. .. ."); id. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("I would adhere to the doctrine adopted in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. and in Justice Black-
mun's Central Hudson concurrence, that all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens
by keeping them ignorant are impermissible.").
334. Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
335. Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Hudson wrong-or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to re-
place it." '336
Although five members of the current Court appear to be ready
to reconsider Central Hudson, it seems quite unlikely that they will be
able to agree on what should take its place. Justice Stevens clearly
favors a balancing approach similar to Justice Blackmun's in Virginia
Pharmacy.37 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, clearly favors a cate-
gorical approach that places truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech in the same category as noncommercial speech.3 8 In 44 Li-
quormart, he objected to "the inherently nondeterminative nature of a
case-by-case balancing 'test' unaccompanied by any categorical rules,"
and criticized Central Hudson for balancing too much.33 9 Justice
Scalia also seems predisposed to adopt a categorical approach.3 40
And while Justice Kennedy has tended to join Justice Stevens's com-
mercial speech opinions in full,341 he too has expressed misgivings
about balancing as a mode of First-Amendment analysis.342
2. The Problem of Mandatory Disclosures
As in the public forum area, a categorical approach for truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech creates some hard cases-particu-
larly when the interests of the speaker and the interests of the listener
collide. Mandatory disclosure requirements, for example, pit the com-
mercial speaker's interest in remaining silent against the listener's in-
terest in receiving additional information on which to base a decision.
336. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, were con-
tent to stick with Central Hudson and found Rhode Island's prohibition of liquor-price
advertising invalid on that basis. See id. at 528-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
337. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
338. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
339. Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas's rejection of balancing may make his explicit endorsement of Justice Blackmun's
reasoning in Virginia Pharmacy seem odd. See id. at 526, 528 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). What Justice Thomas likes about Justice Blackmun's
opinions is not their balancing methodology but their rejection of the paternalistic notion
that a State may protect its citizens by keeping them ignorant. See supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text; see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518, 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
340. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH. L. Rnv.
1175, 1187 (1989) (urging that balancing analysis "be avoided where possible.").
341. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
342. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
Under the categorical approach favored by Justice Thomas, such dis-
closure requirements would seem to be unconstitutional.343 Under
Justice Blackmun's approach, they are not.
A number of laws require commercial speakers to disclose infor-
mation to the public. Two prominent examples are the Surgeon Gen-
eral's warning label on cigarettes 3" and the requirement that issuers
file a registration statement before selling securities to the public.3 45
In a noncommercial context, the Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."'346 Thus, if the First Amendment
requires truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech to be treated ex-
actly the same as noncommercial speech, such mandatory disclosure
laws are arguably unconstitutional.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet faced the constitutional-
ity of mandatory disclosures by commercial speakers, it may be in-
structive to examine its treatment of a law just one step removed from
such disclosures. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. 347 Jus-
tice Stevens upheld the constitutionality of agricultural marketing or-
ders requiring fruit producers to pay for generic advertising of fruit.
He concluded that the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech was not implicated because the marketing orders (1) did not
restrain the producers' speech; (2) did not compel the producers to
343. See infra notes 353-55 and accompanying text.
344. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1998). For an interesting discussion of the constitutionality
of restrictions on tobacco advertising other than warning labels by one of the leading au-
thorities on commercial speech, see Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First
Amendment, 81 IowA L. REv. 589 (1996).
345. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). Commentators have differed over the constitutionality
of these registration requirements. Compare Neuborne, supra note 61, at 59 ("To the ex-
tent SEC forced disclosure rules surrounding registration statements and prospectuses are
necessary to permit informed and autonomous investor choice, they pose no first amend-
ment problems in a hearer-centered setting."), and Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regula-
tion and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. Rnv. 223, 287 (1990) ("regulations requiring
additional disclosure in the service of a more complete, accurate picture of the business
enterprise offering its securities do not violate the first amendment, provided that the ex-
tent of the mandatory disclosure does not overwhelm the promotional message"), with
NIcHoLAs WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRsT AMEtNDMENT RiGrrs AND THE SEC 121 (1990)
("The attempted distinction between mandatory disclosure and outright prohibition cannot
survive analysis.")
346. Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (holding right-of-reply statute unconstitutional); Mc-
Intyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,348 (1995) ("The simple interest in provid-
ing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a
writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit.").
347. 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
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engage in any speech themselves; and (3) did not require the produ-
cers to fund any political or ideological views.1
48
The dissenters treated the issue more categorically and found the
marketing orders unconstitutional. "Since commercial speech is not
subject to any categorical exclusion from First Amendment protec-
tion," Justice Souter wrote, "it becomes subject to a second First
Amendment principle: that compelling cognizable speech officially is
just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to the same
level of scrutiny. '3 49 Justice Souter looked at the marketing orders
from the speaker's point of view and downplayed the interest that lis-
teners might have in forced disclosure. He emphasized the commer-
cial speaker's interest in deciding how to promote its products and
rejected the notion that "the consumer's interest [is] the exclusive
touchstone of commercial speech protection."35 Having concluded
that laws compelling commercial speech should be treated the same
way as laws restricting such speech, Justice Souter (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) applied Central Hudson's inter-
mediate scrutiny test and found that they failed every prong.351 Jus-
tice Thomas, adhering to his position in 44 Liquormart, thought the
marketing orders should be subjected to an even more stringent stan-
dard, which they clearly would fail.352
How would the Court decide a case challenging the constitution-
ality of mandatory disclosures like cigarette warning labels or registra-
tion requirements for securities? Justice Thomas would probably vote
to strike down the mandatory disclosures. He favors a categorical ap-
proach that treats truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech no dif-
348. See id. at 2138. Justice Stevens has elsewhere suggested that requiring mandatory
disclosures by commercial speakers would generally be constitutional. See Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
349. Id. at 2144 (Souter, J., dissenting). Because the Court had held that the freedom
not to speak included the freedom not to subsidize others' speech, see, e.g., Abood v. De-
troit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), Justice Souter treated the forced contributions to
advertising the same as forced advertising. See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144.45 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
350. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2143 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2148 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the argument that the marketing orders were constitutional because
"the effect of compelled funding is to increase the sum of information to the consuming
public"). Justice Blackmun's commercial speech opinions, by contrast, tended to empha-
size the listener's interests and downplay the speaker's. See supra notes 61-66 and accom-
panying text.
351. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2149-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
352. See id. at 2155 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
ferently from noncommercial speech,353 and he joined Justice Souter
in concluding that laws compelling commercial speech should be
treated no differently than laws restricting commercial speech.354 If
the government cannot require a noncommercial speaker to disclose
information that she would prefer to omit,355 Justice Thomas might
reason, then neither may it require disclosures of commercial speak-
ers. Such a result strikes me as unpalatable. Mandatory disclosures
by those who wish to sell tobacco or securities, like commercial speech
generally, serve "individual and societal interests in assuring informed
and reliable decisionmaking. ' 356 "The requirement of a registration
statement and prospectus containing standardized data assures a com-
mon denominator of information that will generally be available to
investors. 3 57 Cigarette warning labels provide smokers and prospec-
tive smokers with useful, truthful information to combat the notion
promoted by cigarette advertising that smoking "is consistent with a
robust lifestyle. '3 58 Justice Thomas's categorical approach would sim-
ply ignore these legitimate interests.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter
would probably vote to uphold such mandatory disclosures by apply-
ing the Central Hudson test. In Glickman, Justice Souter, joined by
the Chief Justice, rejected the notion that laws compelling commercial
speech should be treated differently from laws restricting commercial
speech359 and applied Central Hudson's intermediate-scrutiny test.360
Justice O'Connor has also been one of the Court's strongest defenders
of Central Hudson's categorical approach,361 and I suspect that she
would apply it to evaluate the constitutionality of mandatory disclo-
sures (as opposed to the compelled financing of speech that was at
issue in Glickman).362 While I find such a result palatable, such an
analysis is troubling because it would preserve the notion that truthful,
353. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-28 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); supra notes 338-39 and accompanying
text.
354. See Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144 (Souter, J., dissenting).
355. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
356. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
357. Neuborne, supra note 61, at 59-60.
358. Estreicher, supra note 345, at 272.
359. Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2144 (Souter, J., dissenting).
360. See id. at 2149-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of
Posadas and a dissenter in Discovery Network, seems particularly disinclined to give com-
mercial speech more than an intermediate level of protection.
361. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 528-34 (1996)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
362. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
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nonmisleading commercial speech is entitled to less First Amendment
protection than noncommercial speech. Like Justice Thomas, "I do
not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commer-
cial' speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech." '363 And,
as Justice Blackmun has noted, "the particular consumer's interest in
the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political de-
bate. ' 3 6 4 I fear that the mandatory disclosure cases, if they come, may
prove to be commercial speech's Waterloo, for the Court may reaffirm
Central Hudson's placement of commercial speech in an intermediate
category simply because it sees no other way to sustain the mandatory
disclosures.365
The alternative, of course, would be for the Court to return to its
commercial-speech roots and readopt the listener-oriented balancing
approach that Justice Blackmun set forth in Bigelow, Virginia Phar-
macy, and Bates. That approach rejects the notion that commercial
speech is inherently less valuable than noncommercial speech366 and
would afford commercial speech full First Amendment protection.367
Yet Justice Blackmun's approach also recognizes that because the pro-
tection of commercial speech is based "principally on the First
Amendment interests of the listener, 3 68 the government may require
"additional information, warnings, and disclaimers 3 69 to serve those
interests. Today, only Justice Stevens seems committed to this sort of
balancing approach for commercial speech,37 yet it seems clearly
preferable to either Justice Thomas' or Central Hudson's categorical
alternatives. Justice Thomas' categorical approach would igonore the
listener's interest in receiving the disclosures, while Central Hudson
363. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
364. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
365. It is worth noting that Justice Powell's fear that full First Amendment protection
for commercial speech might invalidate various aspects of securities regulation was, in part,
what led him to relegate commercial speech to a "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
366. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
367. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,436 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
368. Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
369. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
370. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416-28 (resolving the case by balancing inter-
ests); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure requirements are constitutional).
would give effect to that interest but only by diluting the level of pro-
tection afforded to commercial speech generally.
It is often said that hard cases make bad law.37' Sometimes, how-
ever, "it is bad law that is creating the hard cases. '372 Mandatory dis-
closures by commercial speakers restrictions on abortion protesters in
public forums are "hard cases" only if one insists on adhering to cate-
gorical approaches that prevent a court from considering important
interests that are legitimately at stake. Under Justice Blackmun's lis-
tener-oriented balancing approach these cases are relatively easy, and
so they should be.
Conclusion
In this Article, I have tried to make three points about Justice
Blackmun's First Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Justice was
consistent. He employed a listener-oriented balancing approach in
both commercial speech and public forum cases, and he maintained
that approach throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court.
Second, Justice Blackmun's approach was more protective of
speech than the categorical approaches the Court has employed in
each of these areas. This, I have suggested, is because the flexibility of
his approach allowed him to avoid the tendencies towards narrowing
and dilution that are inherent in categorical analysis and that have
manifested themselves in the Court's commercial speech and public
forum jurisprudence. Justice Blackmun's experience in these two ar-
eas contradicts the conventional wisdom that a balancing approach-
and particularly a listener-oriented one-must be less protective of
free speech.
Finally, I have argued that Justice Blackmun's approach provides
an attractive alternative to the Court's current approaches to commer-
cial speech and public forums-approaches that have drawn so much
criticism. Justice Blackmun's approach would allow the Supreme
Court to sustain sensible regulations of speech-like restrictions on
abortion clinic protests and the registration requirements of securities
law-without unduly narrowing or diluting the protection of the First
Amendment.
371. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400-01 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
372. Bhagwat, supra note 284, at 984
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